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NONPUBLIC REASONS AND POLITICAL
PARADIGM CHANGE
IAN BARTRUM†
INTRODUCTION
John Rawls has famously argued that citizens in a just
democracy have a moral duty to ensure that “the principles and
policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the
political values of public reason.”1 This so-called “duty of civility”
obligates us to cast our votes on “ ‘constitutional essentials’ and
questions of basic justice” for reasons that we can explain in
terms of the public good and the “ideals and principles expressed
by society’s conception of political justice.”2 Rawls contrasts
these public reasons with “nonpublic reasons”—such as
“comprehensive religious [and] philosophical doctrine[s]”—which
he claims cannot legitimize acts of political coercion.3 Yet, our
Constitution singles out and protects certain paradigmatic kinds
of nonpublic reasons, at least in the private sphere, and arguably
in the political sphere as well. This Article attempts to justify
these constitutional protections by offering a structural account
of the essential role that nonpublic reasons play in the progress
and evolution of a liberal democratic state. Many thoughtful and
influential scholars—Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre,
Michael Walzer, Jeremy Waldron, and Michael Sandel, to name
just a few—have written on the place of nonpublic reasons in

†
Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. I would like to
thank the participants in the Religious Legal Theory Conference held at St. John’s
Law School on November 5, 2010 for their insight and comments. Thanks also to
Paul Horwitz, John Inazu, Mark Kende, Miguel Schor, the members of the Drake
Law School faculty workshop, and my invaluable research assistant Ross Laird for
their help along the way.
1
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993).
2
Id. at 213, 214, 217.
3
Id. at 220–23.
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democratic debate, and Kent Greenawalt has devoted two entire
books to the subject.4 However, none of them have advanced, at
least directly, the arguments in this Article.
Most attempts to justify the place of nonpublic reasoning in
political discourse proceed along deontological lines. That is,
these efforts ground the claim to constitutional protection in the
primacy of religious duties or obligations and suggest that we
must treat religiously minded people as autonomous ends in
themselves. This is hardly surprising, because these are the very
reasons that motivated the framers to enshrine the Test Oath
and Free Exercise Clauses in the constitutional text. This may
also explain why Rawls framed his objections to non-public
reasoning in the language of deontology5: After all, it is hardly a
satisfying objection to a deontological claim to suggest that
renouncing a duty would produce more efficient results. This
Article contends, however, that—despite the deontological
veneer—Rawls’s proposed exclusion of nonpublic reasons is
actually grounded in consequentalist arguments about the types
of debate and discourse that will produce the best kind of
democracy.
It is, in part, this crossing of deontological and
consequentalist wires that has made the debate over nonpublic
reasoning appear so intractable. The competing arguments often
seem to speak in incommensurable terms, with one side claiming
the privilege of absolute right and the other extolling the
democracy promoting virtues of productive civil discourse. This
Article confronts Rawls’s argument on its own consequentalist
ground. Although the discussion of the religion clauses begins
with a brief exploration of the intellectual history that roots the
text in deontological appeals to religious duty and individual
autonomy, in the end it provides an alternative, consequential
account of the reasons why we should continue to protect
nonpublic reasoning in our political discourse and voting. In this
way, this Article offers a reply to Rawls’s position that does not
4
See generally KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC
REASONS (1995) [hereinafter PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]; KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
5
Deontology, often contrasted with consequentialism or utilitarianism, provides
an account of “moral” reasoning and behavior rooted in a priori duties that we must
fulfill no matter the consequences. Rawls often grounded his claims about basic
political fairness in deontological reasons, and so his arguments about the “duty” to
provide public reasons may simply be an effort to remain consistent in this regard.

WF_Bartrum (Do Not Delete)

2011]

1/24/2012 9:37 PM

NONPUBLIC REASONS

475

simply talk past his premises by presenting deontological
objections to a consequentalist claim. Ultimately, of course, any
competing consequential claims must be assessed against our
political experience, but hopefully this account points out a
productive avenue for future empirical work.
The first Part of this Article discusses the historical
conception of the liberty of conscience, argues that this idea was
the central theoretical justification for the religion clauses at the
time of the founding, and suggests that we can plausibly read the
constitutional text as protecting the right to debate and vote for
nonpublic reasons. Part II sketches Rawls’s arguments and
argues that—the language of duty notwithstanding—these
arguments basically appeal to consequentalist kinds of reasons.
It then presents an original structural account of the value of
nonpublic reasons in political discourse, and looks to both
Thomas Kuhn and the theory of natural selection as illustrative
analogs. The third and final Part briefly recounts the New York
City Catholic schools controversy as a historical example of a
productive political interaction between public and nonpublic
reasoning.
I.

THE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Perhaps the most influential recent account of the central
role that the liberty of conscience played in the history of the
religion clauses is that which Noah Feldman gave in his 2002
article The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause.6
While Feldman is particularly persuasive, he is hardly alone in
recognizing the importance that many of the Constitution’s
principal framers and advocates placed on the rights of
conscience.7 It seems fairly clear to most observers that the
constitutional language embodied at least some of the rich

6
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002).
7
See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); John
Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, (1996).
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heritage of theological and philosophical thought that had
absorbed Europe in the centuries leading up to American
colonization.8
If we believe Feldman, both James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson inherited an intellectual tradition that traces its
lineage from Thomas Aquinas, through Martin Luther, John
Calvin, William Perkins, Roger Williams and the dissenting
Baptists in New England, and on to John Locke.9 This tradition
began with Aquinas’s thoughts about individual human beings’
innate ability to comprehend good and bad as reflected in the
natural law,10 and would later form the basis for Luther’s
revolutionary defiance of Papal authority: “I am bound by the
Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the
word of God. I cannot and I will not retract anything, since it is
neither safe nor right to go against conscience.”11 Thus, it is with
Luther, and Calvin immediately thereafter, that the definitively
Protestant conception of an individual conscience that imposes
duties upon us prior to any civil or ecclesiastical authority was
born.12
It was through Calvin that the liberty of conscience made its
way into the English Puritan world, and was then later carried
on to New England.13 Indeed, despite their notorious intolerance
in the New World, the Puritans included in the famous
Westminster Confession a chapter entitled “Of Christian Liberty,
and Liberty of Conscience,”14 which topic would be the source of a
heated public dispute between Boston minister John Cotton and
Rhode Island’s Roger Williams.15 Williams accused Cotton of
opposing the liberty of conscience. In reply Cotton claimed to
have no problem with a conscience “rightly informed,” but argued
that civil authorities must step in to provide corrective

See Feldman, supra note 6, at 353–54.
Id. at 354–55, 362, 374–78.
10
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 1, at 1008
(Benziger Bros., Inc. ed. 1947) (1266–1273) (“Synderesis [conscience] is said to be the
law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law,
which are the first principles of human actions.”).
11
Feldman, supra note 6, at 358.
12
See id. at 359–61.
13
Id. at 359.
14
WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY, THE CONFESSION OF FAITH, AND THE LARGER AND
SHORTER CATECHISMS 31 (Majestic Printers, 1711) (1647).
15
Feldman, supra note 6, at 365.
8
9
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punishment for those suffering from “erroneous” consciences.16
Williams, not surprisingly, found this to be a distinction without
a difference, and argued instead for the kind of religious
toleration that would form the backbone of Locke’s famous letter
on religious freedom.17
Writing from de facto exile in Holland, Locke made the case
that civil government enjoys very limited jurisdiction over the
religious life of its subjects and certainly has no authority to
“compel any one to his religion.”18 According to Locke’s reading of
Scripture, God had never delegated such a power to the civil
authority, and, as a consequence, must have retained in himself
sole jurisdiction over matters of religion and faith.19 From this
premise, Locke argued that a civil government that attempts to
compel a subject against the dictates of conscience—that innate
knowledge of natural law—actually enforces a kind of hypocrisy
of action against belief, and in this way commits an affront
against God.20 Thus, Locke concluded that, even if the state
could produce certain behavior or action in citizens, this “would
not . . . help at all to the salvation of their souls,” and thus, “when
all is done, they must be left to their own consciences.”21 And it
was very much this Lockean conception of the liberty of
conscience, filtered through a generation of Baptist and
Congregationalist struggles in the northern colonies, that
informed Madison’s and Jefferson’s views in post-revolutionary
Virginia.22
Jefferson began the Lockean thrust with his 1779 Virginia
Statute of Religious Freedom, in which he made two interrelated
arguments in support of the rights of conscience: (1) civil
lawmakers are incompetent to evaluate religious truth; and (2) a
true religion thrives without coercion.23 Jefferson’s statute did
Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 366.
18
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), reprinted in 35 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 3 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1952).
19
Id.; accord Feldman, supra note 6, at 368.
20
Locke, supra note 18; accord Ian Bartrum, Paradise Lost: Good News,
Charitable Choice, and the State of Religious Freedom, 27 VT. L. REV. 177, 182
(2002).
21
Locke, supra note 18, at 4, 10.
22
Feldman, supra note 6, at 381–83.
23
Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted
in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WORD FOR WORD 55, 55–57 (Maureen Harrison & Steve
Gilbert eds., 1993).
16
17
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not immediately pass the Virginia Assembly, however, and in
1784 Patrick Henry introduced his own legislation intended to
remedy a perceived decay in public morality.24 Henry sought
statutory support for a program of religious assessments to pay
Anglican teachers around the Commonwealth, and though
Jefferson was on his way to Paris, Madison took up the flag and
offered a principled objection to the bill.25 In a hastily distributed
pamphlet entitled Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, Madison undertook a vigorous defense of Jefferson’s
views.26 In truth, Madison’s approach was something of a
scattershot broadside—he mustered any plausible argument he
could against Henry’s proposal—but the core of his objections
recalled Locke’s liberty of conscience: Civil jurisdiction is limited
and does not touch the “conscience of every man,” and state
attempts at coercion amount to “an offence against God, not
against man.”27 Ultimately, Madison’s case was persuasive, and
six years after its drafting, Jefferson’s statute of religious
freedom became law in the place of Henry’s assessment bill.28
It seems very likely indeed that these same ideas informed
Madison’s thinking as he drafted and defended the Free Exercise
Clause as a member of the First Congress.29 Though the precise
record of congressional debate on the clause is quite limited,
Madison did clearly say that he understood the language to
prohibit Congress from “compel[ling] men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience.”30 This certainly seemed to
be the hope of many concerned parties during the ratification

Bartrum, supra note 20, at 186.
See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 7, 7–8 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973)
[hereinafter MIND OF THE FOUNDER].
26
Id. at 8.
27
Feldman, supra note 6, at 383–84 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 300, 300 (Robert A. Rutland
& William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973)).
28
See MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 25, at 8.
29
The Establishment Clause is another matter entirely. For a persuasive
account of that clause’s original import, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 42–45 (1998).
30
House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (Aug. 15, 1789)
(comments of Madison), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 92, 93 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
24
25
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debates that took place the preceding year.31 The Virginia
Ratifying Convention thus proposed an amendment to protect
“the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of
conscience,”32 and during the North Carolina debates Henry
Abbot expressed his concern that the proposed Constitution did
not guarantee citizens “the privilege of worshipping God
according to their consciences.”33 In short, the Free Exercise
Clause that the ratifying states demanded, and which Madison
intended to provide, was one grounded in the intellectual
tradition that had grown up around the liberty of conscience.
These same sentiments characterize the ratification debates
surrounding the Test Oath Clause, which prohibits any religious
test for federal office, included in Article VI of the original text.34
Again, the material on the actual drafting of the clause is limited:
It was added with very little debate near the end of the
convention at Madison’s urging—with some slight modification
by Charles Pinkney and Gouvernor Morris35—and the only brief
objection came from Roger Sherman, who thought it unnecessary
given the “prevailing liberality” of the times.36 But, as with the
Free Exercise Clause, the intellectual motivations are made
clearer in the ratification debates. Oliver Ellsworth probably
shed the most light on the question in Connecticut, where the
established congregationalists saw the Test Oath Clause as a
concession to the dissenting Baptists, and thus worried that the
language was hostile to organized religion.37 Ellsworth argued
that, on the contrary, the clause was meant to “exclude
persecution, and to secure to you the important right of religious
liberty,” a liberty which he defined as every man’s “right to
worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his

31
See generally Virginia Ratifying Convention, Proposed Amendments (June 27,
1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 89, 89; Debate
in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788) (cmts. of Henry Abbot),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 89, 89.
32
Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 31.
33
Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, supra note 31.
34
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
35
Madison’s Notes (Aug. 30, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 475, 461 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
36
Id. at 468.
37
Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 639, 640–41 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
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conscience.”38 Ellsworth in Connecticut was not alone: Tench
Coxe in Pennsylvania argued that with the clause, the
government had “divested itself of a power, every exercise of
which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven,”39 and Reverend
Samuel Payson told the Massachusetts ratifying convention that
“human tribunals for the consciences of men are impious
encroachments upon the prerogatives of God.”40 It seems then
that the same protection of conscience which the Free Exercise
Clause promised to citizens in 1789, the Test Oath Clause had
already extended to federal legislators in 1787.
Once we have established that these provisions of the
constitutional text came into being to protect individual
conscience and the duties it imposes against the coercive power of
the state, it is not too great a leap to conclude that the text must
also protect our right to deliberate and cast votes for
paradigmatically nonpublic kinds of reasons. It is, after all, in
matters of great political controversy and import that this
protection may be most needed, and it seems to be precisely the
problem of enforced heterodoxy or conformity that the
constitutional text is intended to combat. It is true, of course,
that if wielded in certain ways—for what Kent Greenawalt has
called “imposition” kinds of nonpublic reasons41—the power of the
vote may in fact work to burden others’ rights of conscience. But
it may very well be that this is the very evil that the
Establishment Clause—at least the substantive version we have
come to know through the Fourteenth Amendment—aims to
prevent. That is, the Free Exercise and Test Oath Clauses exist
in a kind of dialectic tension with the Establishment Clause: The
former clauses guarantee citizens and legislators the right to vote
with their consciences, while the latter clause ensures that truly
“imposition” kinds of policies cannot have the force of law.
At the core of this dialectic, however, remains the
Id. at 639.
Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution (1787), reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 639, 639.
40
Debate in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 30, 1788) (cmts. of
Mr. Payson), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 642,
643.
41
PUBLIC CONSCIENCES, supra note 4, at 57. Greenawalt opposes uses of
nonpublic reasoning that “impose” burdens on other’s freedom of conscience and/or
exercise. He contrasts this with nonpublic reasoning that imposes burdens only on
the reasoner herself.
38
39
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same fundamental constitutional purpose: We should protect
individual conscience against state intrusion precisely because it
is a source of nonpublic reasons—reasons that we cannot hope to
protect through the public political process—and because
conscience imposes deontological duties upon us with which the
just state should not interfere.
II. THE “DUTY” OF CIVILITY AND POLITICAL PARADIGM SHIFT
It is, perhaps, because the constitutional protections
provided to religious reasoning seem so deeply rooted in
deontology that Rawls styles his objection to nonpublic reasons in
political discourse as grounded in a “duty of civility.”42 Indeed,
Rawls expressly argues that this duty imposes “a moral, not a
legal” obligation on us,43 and he locates the very idea of “public
reasons” in the Kantian tradition.44 With this in mind, it is clear
that Rawls at least claims to justify his proposed exclusion of
nonpublic reasoning on deontological grounds; that is, he frames
his argument so as to present an obligation that can compete
with—and perhaps exclude—other kinds of obligations, including
those imposed by religion or conscience. A slightly deeper look at
Rawls’s—at least original—account, however, suggests that his
underlying worries about the place of nonpublic reasons in
political discourse are actually concerns about consequences.
This becomes clearer when we explore the role that public
reasoning is supposed to play in bringing about the “[i]deal of
[d]emocratic [c]itizenship.”45
Rawls’s ideal citizen exists within an inherited social
structure, and understands the just exercise of political power as
the collective will of free and equal citizens.46 With these
considerations in mind, Rawls contends that the ideal citizen will
recognize certain “legitimate” grounds for the exercise of coercive
political power.47 He claims these grounds are those “which all
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and

42
43
44
45
46
47

RAWLS, supra note 1.
Id.
Id. at 213 & n.2.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 216–17.
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rational.”48 Thus, as it is “reasonable[ness] and rational[ity]”
that give rise to political legitimacy, the “ideal” obligates a citizen
to advocate only those exercises of power she can explain in
terms of public reasons.49 Significantly, while the ideal may
impose upon us a duty not to coerce people irrationally, it is not
clear that this duty carries through and obligates us to base our
political arguments or votes on public reasons. Rather, it is only
because Rawls believes that the right kinds of arguments and
deliberations—those based in public reasoning—are most likely
to produce rational—and thus legitimate—exercises of coercion
that he would exclude nonpublic reasons from the debate.50 It
might, in fact, be true that the injection of unreasonable and
irrational arguments into political discourse ends up producing a
quite reasonable and rational instantiation of political power,
and if this were the case then the nonpublic reasoner would have
fulfilled her obligation to the democratic ideal. But to Rawls this
seems unlikely, and so it is the probable consequence of nonpublic
reasoning—its tendency to produce irrational, and thus
illegitimate, laws—that principally concerns him.51
Upon close examination, then, we should understand Rawls’s
objection to nonpublic reasoning itself as grounded in
consequentalism.
Essentially, his claim is that nonpublic
reasons are likely to produce the wrong kind of political debate—
one that results in acts of illegitimate political coercion. At this
point, this may seem unnecessarily formalistic or to be splitting
hairs—why should we care if his account is deontological or
consequentalist at root? There is actually a good reason to care
in this case: If we want to confront Rawls’s claim on its own
merits and in terms of its own justifications, we need to be clear
about what those merits and justifications are. Here, as those
justifications are consequentalist in nature, it is necessary to
provide a competing consequentalist account; an account that
suggests that nonpublic reasoning in public discourse may
sometimes promote the kinds of political decision making that
produce the best, or most ideal, democratic results. And, even if
this is not true most of the time, the effect of nonpublic reasoning

48
49
50
51

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 221–22.

WF_Bartrum (Do Not Delete)

2011]

1/24/2012 9:37 PM

NONPUBLIC REASONS

483

may be so valuable on those occasions when it does produce good
results that we are willing to protect its place in all political
discourse.
The competing account this Article offers draws on two
scientific analogies, and, as with most analogies, it is imperfect.
Nonetheless, these analogies remain useful and productive, and
hopefully the reader will treat them charitably. The first analogy
is to Thomas Kuhn’s theoretical account of scientific revolutions
rooted in instances of “paradigm change.”52
A Kuhnian “paradigm change” is a revolutionary moment in
scientific progress where some insight changes the entire focus
and object of scientific inquiry in a particular field.53 Typically,
such an insight follows on the heels of an increase in anomalous
empirical observations: Instances where the accepted theoretical
paradigm cannot predict or explain a particular set of data.54 As
these anomalies continue to mount, the existing paradigm
strains to provide a consistent account of the problematic data,
and eventually the paradigm itself crumbles in the light of a
fundamental insight that allows for a more comprehensive and
coherent explanation of the observations.55 There are many
examples of such revolutionary moments, but perhaps the most
illustrative is the shift from a Ptolemaic, geocentric paradigm of
the solar system to the Copernican heliocentric model. For
years, astronomers tacked increasingly complex and convoluted
addenda onto Ptolemy’s basic structure in order to explain
anomalous observations such as planetary retrograde; but
eventually the Copernican model—which could account for the
anomalies quite simply—won over the scientific community.56
The blinding insight, of course, was simply to move the sun to the
center of the system.
For the purposes of this Article, the important point about
these kinds of insights is that they are not available or
explainable within the existing paradigm of scientific thought—

52
See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
52–53 (3d ed. 1996).
53
See generally id. at 92–97.
54
Id. at 52.
55
Id.
56
RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING THE
IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD 248–51 (First Ballantine Books ed. 1993)
(1991).
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they require a thorough recalibration of fundamental premises.57
Indeed, in comparing paradigm changing insights to political
revolutions, Kuhn observes, “Though revolutions have had a vital
role in the evolution of political institutions, that role depends
upon their being partially extrapolitical or extrainstitutional
events.”58 Put simply, a paradigm changing insight is, by
definition, not fully explainable within the structures of the
existing paradigm. To analogize this thought to our examination
of nonpublic reasons, consider that a “duty of civility,” which
requires us to deliberate and vote only in terms of publicly
accessible, “overlapping consensus” kinds of reasons, works to
suppress and subvert the possibility of “paradigm change” kinds
of moments in political science.59 This is so because it may be
that a political position is not explainable in terms of existing
public values and rationales precisely because those values and
rationales are, in some important way, wrong.
Concededly, if values and rationales are widely held, they
are likely to be right—of course, we might at one time have said
the same thing of Ptolemy’s model of the solar system. But they
might not be—in which case dissenters will need to reach for
something transcendental on which to base their arguments.
Think, for example, of South Africa, or the American south, and
racial slavery or segregation. The existing public reasons in
those communities were a matter of some debate, but at least
the dominant kinds of reasons appeared to justify racially
discriminatory sorts of practices. It was only by reaching outside
of those communities—to world opinion, to northern liberal
opinion, or, indeed, in many cases to religious principles—that
people within those systems could ground their arguments
against the existing value structures. Like a scientific paradigm
change, which cannot be justified within the existing paradigm,
deep political innovation sometimes requires a recalibration of
fundamental assumptions and principles. And while it may well
be true that the majority—perhaps even the vast majority—of
nonpublic reasons for political advocacy will not be productive,
paradigm changing kinds of insights, these insights are so

57
58
59

See generally KUHN, supra note 52, at 92–94.
Id. at 93–94 (emphasis added).
For the concept of “overlapping consensus,” see RAWLS, supra note 1, at 133.

WF_Bartrum (Do Not Delete)

2011]

1/24/2012 9:37 PM

NONPUBLIC REASONS

485

important and valuable when they do come along that we should
always provide a structural place for nonpublic reasoning at the
political table.
The second, shorter, analogy is to the theory of natural
selection and its role in the evolution of species. In this analogy,
nonpublic reasoning fulfills something like the function that
“mutation” does in Darwin’s model. Mutation, recall, is the
engine of design change that drives the selection process
forward.60 Without some, at least small, leaps forward in
biological design—leaps that occur for no reason readily
explainable in terms of the existing biological system—there
would be no significant design differences for nature to select
among. There would be only the status quo.
But it is also worth remembering Niles Eldredge and
Stephen Jay Gould’s important contributions to our
understanding of this process.61 Their landmark paper—which
supplants the traditional model of “phyletic gradualism” with a
theory of “punctuated equilibria”—pointed out that Darwin
viewed the actual fossil record of species “more as an
embarrassment than as an aid to his theory.”62 This is because
Darwin’s theory suggested that there should be “infinitely
numerous transitional links” that would show the slow, steady,
and gradual process of biological evolution—but the fossil record
actually reveals long periods of evolutionary stasis, or
“morphologic stability,” when very limited adaptation seems to
have occurred.63 Indeed, rather than a steady, gradual process,
the evidence seems to indicate that biological change happens in
spurts; what Eldredge and Gould called periods of “punctuated
equilibria.”64 While Darwin tried to explain this phenomenon
away as the product of an incomplete evidentiary record,65
Eldredge and Gould theorized that, although mutations are
happening all the time, true biological evolution occurs only
60
Ruth Hershberg & Dmitri A. Petrov, Evidence that Mutation Is Universally
Biased Towards AT in Bacteria, PLOS GENETICS, Sept. 2010, at 1, available at
http://petrov.stanford.edu/pdfs/73.pdf.
61
See generally Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, reprinted in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82, 82–
115 (T.J.M. Schopf ed., 1972).
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Id. at 87.
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See id. at 110.
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Id.
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Id. at 87.
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when there is some change in a local environment that happens
to benefit a particular change in biological design.66 Thus, the
periods of punctuated equilibria—those characterized by rapid
and prevalent evolutionary change67—are precipitated by
changes in the environment with which the ever-present process
of mutation may or may not correspond.
The theory of punctuated equilibria is important to the
analogy for this reason: it is probably true that the vast majority
of mutations—in this analogy, the vast majority of nonpublic
reasons for voting—will not match up with a particular change in
the democratic environment. Thus, these mutations will not be
selected for, and will wither away as do unproductive biological
mutations.
But some mutations—again, some nonpublic
reasons—will actually match up with nascent changes in the
democratic environment in ways that the status quo—existing
public reasons—could not have done. It is as a result of these
mutations that a democracy can reach a state of equilibrium that
best reflects the actual liberal democratic environment—the
collective will of free and equal citizens—it is meant to represent.
By the same mechanism, we are protected against the
commonplace, counterproductive nonpublic reasons that might
otherwise threaten democratic stability. In a Federalist 10 meets
Origin of Species kind of way, then, our greatest hope for
meaningful freedom and political stability lies in our willingness
to give a wide diversity of views a voice in a pluralist political
structure.
Hopefully these analogies offer at least some reason to think
that giving nonpublic reasons a place in our political discourse
may actually produce good consequences of the kind that move us
closer to an “ideal” democratic state. It may, in fact, be true that
nonpublic reasons are most valuable in political discourse when
they force us to revise and refine our public reasoning so that it
better reflects what we believe are its idealistic goals. Nonpublic
reasoning’s main value, that is, may be as a foil—a devil’s
advocate—that helps us better understand the public values and
overlapping consensus we envision.
A truly compelling
evaluation of this account will, of course, require real empirical
evidence; that is, after all, the proper method by which to
66
See id. at 94–95 (“[S]election always maintains an equilibrium between
populations and their local environment.”).
67
Id. at 84.
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evaluate competing consequentalist claims.
At this time,
however, all this Article can offer is anecdotal evidence; it does so
below with a very brief account of the controversy over Catholic
schooling that took place in New York City in the early 1840s.
III. THE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL CONTROVERSY
The roots of the Catholic school controversy in New York
City actually stretch back well before the 1840s, to the
beginnings of the “common school” movement in New England
and the northeastern states.68 That movement, which aimed to
provide education for all, not just poor, children in the same
state-funded classrooms, also hoped to use schooling as a vehicle
by which to ease social tensions and promote a common sense of
purpose and identity.69 The common school movement began in
New York City in 1805, when nearly one hundred of the “best
elements of the old English, Dutch, and other families” petitioned
the state legislature for incorporation of what they called the
“Free School Society.”70 By 1813, the Society was receiving New
York City’s portion of the funds that the state legislature had
allocated for education. In 1826 the group changed its name to
the New York Public School Society (the “Society”) and took
nearly sole responsibility for public education in the city.71
After 1824, the state school funding statute expressly
provided that no public money would go to support sectarian
religious organizations—but the term “sectarian” was widely
understood as referring only to the practices of specific religious
denominations.72 By contrast, the Society operated its schools on
a nonsectarian basis, which meant its teachers promoted generic
Protestant values, and encouraged general readings from the
King James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer.73 While the
Society saw “nonsectarianism” as religiously neutral, the policy
plainly did not serve the interests of a growing Catholic

Much of the material, and some of the language, in this section appeared
originally in Ian Bartrum, The Political Origins of Secular Public Education: The
New York School Controversy, 1840–1842, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & L. 267 (2008).
69
Id. at 281.
70
THOMAS BOESE, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ITS HISTORY,
CONDITION, AND STATISTICS 26 (1869).
71
Bartrum, supra note 68, at 288, 291.
72
Id. at 283.
73
Id. at 285.
68
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minority.74 Indeed, an 1829 Pastoral Letter suggested that, in
the common schools, “the school-boy can scarcely find a book in
which some one or more of our institutions or practices is not
exhibited far otherwise than it really is, and greatly to our
disadvantage: the entire system of education is thus tinged
throughout its whole course.”75
The influx of Catholic
immigrants continued, however, and in 1839 Governor William
Seward recognized that the Society’s religious biases were
alienating an unacceptable number of the city’s children.76 He
therefore recommended that the legislature establish “schools in
which [Catholics] may be instructed by teachers speaking the
same language with themselves, and professing the same faith.”77
New York City Catholics, under the leadership of Bishop
John Hughes, quickly seized the political opportunity to petition
the city’s Common Council (the “Council”) for a share of the state
education funds.78 The Society vigorously opposed the Catholic
petition, and, not surprisingly, the Council rejected the
application.79 Undaunted, Bishop Hughes presented the Council
with a second petition, this time detailing the Catholics’ specific
objections to the Society’s Protestant readings and practices.80
After a widely publicized two-day debate between Hughes and
the Society’s lawyers—during which vast crowds choked the
rooms and corridors of City Hall—the Council again rejected the
Catholic petition.81 But Bishop Hughes remained hopeful, and
told his congregation “we have an appeal to a higher power than
the Common Council—to the Legislature of the State . . . . [A]nd

Id. at 284–85.
First Provincial Council of Baltimore, Pastoral Letter to the Laity (Oct. 17,
1829), reprinted in PETER GUILDAY, THE NATIONAL PASTORALS OF THE AMERICAN
HIERARCHY (1792–1919) 19, 28 (1954).
76
Bartrum, supra note 68, at 297–99.
77
William Seward, Annual Message to the Legislature (1840), reprinted in THE
LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS WORKS 212, 212–13
(George Baker ed., 1855).
78
Bartrum, supra note 68, at 299.
79
Id. at 301.
80
Id. at 303.
81
Id. at 303–05.
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75
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though a whole Board should be found to bend the knee to the
Baal of bigotry, men will be found who can stand unawed in its
presence . . . .”82
After Secretary of State John Spencer issued a scathing
report based on his study of the New York City public schools,
the State Assembly took up a reform bill entitled “An Act to
Extend the Benefits of Common School Education in the City of
New York.”83 But the Society still had enough political muscle to
get the bill tabled for the remainder of the 1841 session, which
development distressed Hughes enough that he decided to take
direct political action.84 During the postponement, a statewide
election was held in which the city’s two senate and thirteen
assembly seats were up for grabs.85 At a meeting just days before
the election, Hughes presented Catholics with his own handpicked slate of acceptable candidates—a slate that opponents
would derisively label the “Church and State Party”—and
exhorted an excited crowd:
You have often voted for others and they did not vote for you,
but now you are determined to uphold with your own votes your
own rights. Will you then stand by the rights of your offspring,
who have so long suffered under the operation of this injurious
system?
[Loud cheering] Will you adhere to the nomination made?
We will! We will!
Will you be united?
[Standing ovation]
Will you let all men see that you are worthy sons of the nation
to which you belong?
Never fear—we will! We will till death!
Will you prove yourselves worthy of friends?
[Loud cheering]
Will none of you flinch?
[Indescribable excitement].86

82
John Hughes, Address to a Meeting in Washington Hall (Feb. 11, 1841),
reprinted in 1 COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN HUGHES, 242, 244–45 (Lawrence Kehoe
ed., 1866).
83
Bartrum, supra note 68, at 310–13.
84
Id. at 313–15.
85
Id. at 313–14.
86
JOHN R. G. HASSARD, LIFE OF THE MOST REVEREND JOHN HUGHES, D. D.,
FIRST ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK 245 (1866).
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Hughes would never quite live down his political
maneuvering on this day. Indeed, it earned him the nickname
“the political bishop” from New York Herald editor James Gordon
Bennett. But, the prospect of a unified Catholic vote struck fear
in the hearts of the city democrats, and ultimately shaped the
debate to come in Albany.87
Although the state legislature eventually passed a law
centralizing education administration in the city—thus
bringing down the Society—it was in many ways a hollow victory
for the Catholics.88 Despite John Spencer’s recommendation that
the state set up localized community school districts that could
decide for themselves what religious messages they wanted in
particular classrooms, the final law expressly banned “sectarian”
teaching in public schools.89 As a result, Catholics would still
have to surrender their children to Protestant nonsectarian
schools, and eventually nonsectarianism would give way to
secularism.90 Hughes would spend his later years lamenting
public education’s descent into “godlessness,” and, after the Civil
War, the American Catholic Hierarchy began to make plans for a
comprehensive network of independent, privately-funded
Catholic schools.91 It is thus the perhaps ironic legacy of “the
political bishop” and his “Church and State Party” that they were
unwitting allies in the coming movement to drive religion
entirely out of public schooling. As Vincent Lannie has observed:
As a result [of the school controversy], many Catholic authors
have honored Hughes as the father of Catholic education in
America. If this be so, then it is paradoxical that the father of
American Catholic education should also have acted as the
catalyst in the eventual secularization of American public
education.92

But the preservation of nonsectarianism was a temporary
victory for the Protestants, too. Though they had succeeded
in defeating Catholic hopes for public school money, their
arguments about the need for religious neutrality would
Bartrum, supra note 68, at 314 & n.271, 315.
Id. at 318–19.
89
Id. at 317.
90
Id. at 319.
91
Id.
92
VINCENT P. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION: BISHOP
HUGHES, GOVERNOR SEWARD, AND THE NEW YORK SCHOOL CONTROVERSY 258
(1968).
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eventually prove too much. The same arguments that excluded
Catholic educational practices would eventually exclude the
King James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer as well,
and so it may be interesting to realize that those Protestant
communities that complain most aggressively about secular
schools today are, in a historical sense, hoist on their own
petard.93
And so, even though it took time to reach fruition, the
injection of nonpublic reasons into both sides of the political
debate over the New York City schools would eventually bring
us greater clarity about the ways that our educational system
should reflect our democratic ideals. The threat of a unified
Catholic vote was a shock to the state political system; one
that forced both sides of the debate to recognize and take
responsibility for an evolving conception of religious freedom
and neutrality.94 Indeed, it was in building and refining a set
of public reasons to oppose the Catholic petitions that the
Protestant majority began to identify and construct the values
and rationales that would ultimately lead to secular public
education on a nationwide basis. In this sense, the “Church and
State Party” provided the kind of jolt—the political mutation or
anomaly—that would eventually lead to a paradigm changing
political insight. And in this way, hopefully the New York City
school controversy provides a useful example of a circumstance in
which nonpublic reasoning played a critical role in producing
political results that we might believe are a better reflection of
our American democratic ideals.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that John Rawls’s so-called “duty of
civility,” which obligates us to deliberate and cast our votes for
“public reasons,” probably is framed in deontological language
because it is intended to compete with the other deontological
kinds of reasons—religious duties—that seem to support the
constitutional protection of free religious exercise. Despite
the styling, however, Rawls’s argument for excluding
nonpublic reasons from political discourse actually sounds in
consequentalism; essentially he believes that allowing only public
93
94

Bartrum, supra note 68, at 320.
Id. at 320–21.
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reasons to enter our political deliberations is the best way to
produce rational, and thus legitimate, exercises of democratic
political authority. When we recognize that Rawls’s argument on
this point is actually consequentalist in nature, it becomes
necessary to challenge his account on its own grounds—with a
competing consequentalist account.
This Article suggests that nonpublic reasons can provide the
kind of fundamental ideological diversity necessary to catalyze
moments of deep political innovation. In making this argument,
this Article draws two imperfect analogies to the world of science.
The first is to Thomas Kuhn’s conception of scientific revolutions
grounded in paradigm changing insights. These insights are not
available within the existing paradigms of scientific inquiry, and
thus depend upon a fundamental reordering of scientific norms.
Nonpublic reasons may serve this purpose in political science,
and we should therefore protect their place in our discussions
precisely because they represent ideas that we could not explain
in terms of the existing paradigm of political values. The second
analogy is to the theory of natural selection and punctuated
equilibria. Nonpublic reasons may also act in the way that
“mutations” do in the evolution of species. That is, they can
provide nonlinear kinds of change, which an evolving
environment may select for or against.
Because these
“mutations” only manage to produce real adaptations when such
changes suit the shifting democratic environment, the danger
they present to political stability is minimal. When such a
mutation does match up with an important change in
environment, however, its value is so great that we need to
account for and protect its place in our political discourse at all
times.
Finally, this Article presents the New York City Catholic
school controversy as a historical and anecdotal illustration of a
productive interaction between public and nonpublic reasoning.
The injection of nonpublic reasons into the debate over public
education in the 1840s presented such a shock to the political
system that it forced us to refine and reconstruct the kinds of
public reasoning that might bring us closer to our democratic
ideals. It was, in other words, in coming to terms with the
nonpublic reasons forwarded in the Catholic school debate that
we began to recognize the ways that our existing political value
structure was out of line with our larger ideals. And, if we are
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going to argue in consequentalist terms, this is precisely why we
should protect and value nonpublic reasons in our political
discourse. They can bring about moments of real political
honesty and inspire the kind of deep democratic creativity that
may bring our overlapping consensus of political values into
closer focus. Most importantly, they may inspire conversations
that ultimately bring our political realities into better alignment
with our democratic ideals.

